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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE ST'A TE OF UTAH 
~rrATE ROAD COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Pla.intiff an.d Appellant, 
-vs.-
, 
urr1\.H POWER & LIGHT COM- \ 
P ANY, a corporation; MOUNTAIN \ 
FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, a r· 
corporation, and MOUNTAIN 
STATES TELEPHONE AND 
TELGRAPH COMPANY, a cor-
poration, 
Defen.da.n.ts an.d Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9163 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was commenced by the State Road Com-
mission and challenges on constitutional grounds the 
validity of Chapter 53 of the 1957 Session Laws of Utah, 
no\v Section 27-2-7, Subsection (22), Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. This section is commonly ref erred to as the 
utility relocation act and in substance provides that the 
appellant here will pay all of the costs incurred by a util-
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ity incident to relocating its facilities when the same 
becomes necessary by reason of interstate highway con-
struction. No distinction is made as to whether the exist-
ing facility is within or without the right-of-way of the 
existing highway, and the only condition to payment is 
that the ·state highway department be in a position to 
obtain proportionate reimbursement from federal funds. 
The complaint of the State Road Commission alleged 
that the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany had been granted a franchise by Davis County to 
erect and maintain telephone poles an~ .wires within the 
right of way of a county road known as Howard Street. 
A portion of this county road will now become a part of 
the national system of interstate and defense highways 
and the poles and wires of the telephone co~pany must 
be removed and relocated. 
As to Mountain Fuel Supply Company, the complaint 
alleged that there were located certain facilities within 
the right-of-way boundaries of Seventh East Street in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, by virtue of a franchise granted by 
the city. This street from Thirteenth South Street to 
Simpson Avenue has been designed as a federal aid sec-
ondary highway and the present widening of this street 
will require the relocation of the fuel company's facilities. 
Utah Power and Light Company is also the recip-
ient of a franchise from Salt Lake City that permits the 
erection of p.<;>les and electric light and power lines within 
the right-of-way of the city streets. Interstate highway 
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construction along Sixth West Street between North 
rremple and Fifth North Streets necessitate the reloca-
tion of these facilities. 
In all three instances the utility h~s demanded of 
the State Road Commission that it paythe costs incurred 
in the relocation of the facilities of the utility. The Com-
mission contends that it cannot legally make such pay-
ment and this action is brought under the provisions of 
the Declaratory Judgments Act, Chapter 33 of Title 78, 
·Utah Code Annotated, 1953_, to determine the controversy. 
After the complaint was filed, the three defendant 
utilities answered effectively admitting the factual alle-
gations but denying that the act_ in question was uncon-
stitutional.. Both parties thereupon filed separate motions 
for judgment on the pleadings. The c·ourt below denied 
the motion of the plaintiff, granted that of the defendants, 
held the Utility Relocation Act to be constitutional and 
ordered the State Road Commission to reimburse the de-
fendant utilities for their relocation costs. This appeal is 
taken from that judgment. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
SECTION 27-2-7(22), UTAH CODE ANNOTAT-
ED, 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 53, 
LAWS OF UTAH, 1957, VIOLATES SECTION 
27 OF ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH. 
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PoiNT II. 
SECTION 27-2-7(22), UTAH CODE ANNOTAT-
ED, 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 53, 
LAWS OF UTAH, 1957, VIOLATES SECTION 
31 OF ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
SECTION 27-2-7(22), UTAH CODE ANNOTAT-
ED, 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 53, 
LAWS OF UTAH, 1957, VIOLATES SECTION 
27 OF ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH. 
PoiNT n. 
SECTION 27-2-7(22), UTAH CODE ANNOTAT-
ED, 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 53, 
LAWS OF UTAH, 1957, VIOLATES SECTION 
31 OF ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH. 
The arguments to be hereinafter advanced in support 
of the position of the State Road Commission can be best 
combined as to both points in order to avoid needless 
repetition. 
We commence with the assertion, that we believe to 
be unassailable, that it is a proper exercise of the police 
power of the state in requiring public utilities to relocate 
at their own expense facilities placed on public land when-
ever that relocation is justified by the need of the state to 
make a greater use of its lands and of its streets and 
highways. This principle is sustained in the case of 
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Oll'e'nsboro v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
230 U. S. 58, and inN ew Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage 
Com;nission of New Orleans, 197 U. S. 453, 25 S. Ct. 471, 
49 Ij. Ed. 831. 
The 1957 Utah State Legislature now seeks to change 
this established rule and to require that the state assume 
this entire cost of relocation. We maintain that this oper-
ates to release and extinguish an obligation and liability 
presently existing in favor of the state and that it oper-
ates to lend the credit of the state to these utilities that 
benefit thereunder. 
The Federal Highway Act of 1956 first permitted re-
imbursement to the state of the payment of relocation 
costs of utilities but provided that ''federal funds shall 
not be used to reimburse the state under this section when 
the payment to the utility violates the law of the state or 
violates a legal contract between the utility and the state.'' 
23 U. S. C. A., Sec. 123. 
rrhe United States Department of Commerce, Bureau 
of Public Roads, has issued a policy and procedure memo-
randum No. 30-4 and Section 3(2) contains a requirement 
'~that the state certifies that payment for the utility relo-
cation is not in violation of the laws of the state or any 
legal contract between the utility and the state. If there 
should be any question as to the state's authority to pay 
for such relocation, the state may be required to cite 
or establish its authority to pay for such relocation.'' 
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Since the enactment of the quoted provision by the 
Federal Highway Act of 1956, a number of states have 
passed amendments to their state highway codes in order 
to enable their highway commissions to pay utility reloca-
tion costs a~d secure proportionate reimbursement with 
federal funds. The legislative action in this respect has 
had judicial review in seven states in which a statute simi-
lar to the Utah statute was involved. In addition, the 
general question of the costs of relocating utilities has 
been before the courts of five other states. We believe it 
proper in the present instance to comment on each of 
these cases. 
The five states, whose courts have reviewed the util-
ity relocation problem, but without benefit of a specific 
statute, are Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New 
York and Kentucky. 
In the case of Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. State 
Roads Commission, 214 Md. 266, 134 A. 2d 312, a petition 
for a declaratory judgment was filed by the Commission 
seeking an interpretation of a statute passed by the Mary-
land legislature. This legislation directed the Commis-
sion to build a tunnel under the Patapsco River in Balti-
more Harbor as a. revenue bond project and the portion 
of the statute under dispute read that ''all private prop-
'erty damaged or destroyed in carrying out the powers 
granted by this sub-title shall be restored or repaired and 
placed in its original condition a.s nearly as practicable or 
adequate compensation made therefor * * *.'' 
The Court stated the problem as follows: 
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"Unless the legislature directs to the contrary, the 
rule is that .a public utility must, at its own ex-
pense, remove and relocate its service facilities, in, 
on or under a public road or other land owned by 
the state if this is made necessary by improvement 
or extension of the road system. The question be-
fore us is whether the legislature, in authorizing 
the State Roads Commission to build toll bridges, 
tunnels and motorw~ys * * * changed this com-
mon law rule as to relocations required by the con-
struction of revenue ·projects.'' 
The Court proceeded to hold that the section of the statute 
quoted above did change the. common law rule in Mary-
land as to the relocation of utility facilities on revenue 
bond projects. 
In connection with this Maryland case; we would 
direct attention to the -fact that it dealt with a revenue 
bond project and did not involve either the release of an 
obligation to the state nor a pledge of the credit of the 
state. No constitutional questions were submitted to or 
decided by the Court. 
In the case of TVilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 
360, 142 A. 2d 837, a taxpayers' suit sought to prevent 
the city and its planning board from proceeding under the 
Blighted Area Act on grounds that the act was unconsti-
tutional. The Blighted Area Act provided in general 
terms for community redevelopment by municipalities 
after following certain required procedures and the act 
itself made provision for the payment of the costs of util-
ity relocation. This was attacked only on the grounds that 
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it was discriminatory and that no similar provision was 
made for the homeowner or the businessman. 
The Court found that the act was not discriminatory, 
that utilities are necessary adjuncts of the public welfare 
and may be treated as a class, and that "the requirement 
of equal protection is satisfied if all persons within a 
class reasonably selected are treated alike. '' Again we 
submit that there is no constitutional provision similar 
to that in the Utah Constitution involved here. 
In Delaware River Port Authority v. Pennsylvooia 
Public Utility Commission, 393 Pa. 639, 145 A. 2d 172, the 
Commission had entered an order requiring the Authority 
to pay the entire cost of relocating certain facilities of an 
electric company in connection with the construction of 
the Walt Whitman bridge across the Delaware River. 
On appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that 
the Commission had exceeded its authority in that the 
statute gave it the power to direct such payment only to 
utili ties engaged in the transportation of passengers or 
property. The Court referred to the common law rule 
requiring that utilities pay the entire cost of relocation 
where their facilities were on the public right-of-way and 
stated that "a legislative intent to effect any departure 
from a firmly established policy of the law must be ex-
pressed in clear and unequivocal language.'' Again no 
constitutional problem was presented or decided. 
Of interest is the following quotation from the case of 
Department of Highways v. Pennsylvarnia Public Utility 
Commission, 185 Pa. Super. 1, 136 A. 2d 473: 
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• 'This situation encouraged the introduction of 
bills in various state legislatures to require the 
state (and thus the federal government) to pay for 
the relocation of utilities located within the high-
\vay rights-of-way. Opposition to this proposed 
legislation arose among automobile clubs, and 
others, who saw in it a substantial reduction of 
available funds for desperately needed highway 
construction. For this and other reasons the pro-
posals in most states were not enacted into law. 
'·In Pennsylvania House Bill No. 984 (Session of 
1957) passed the House and Senate, but was vetoed 
by the Governor July 16, 1957. The bill provided 
that whenever the Secretary of Highways should 
determine that any utility located in, on, or above, 
any highway should be relocated to accommodate 
a reimbursable federal-aid highway project the 
cost of relocation should be paid by the Common-
wealth out of the Motor License Fund.'' 
The New York courts have dealt with this problem 
as a statutory one only and have reached different con-
clusions depending upon the statute involved. An early 
case, Oswego & Syra,cuse Ra,ilroa.d Co. v. Sta.te, 226 N.Y. 
351, 124 N. E. 8, involved the required destruction and 
rebuilding of a railroad bridge across a barge canal in 
order to accommodate increased traffic and larger vessels. 
The court determined that the statute in question required 
the State of New York to pay the cost of rebuilding the 
larger structure. 
Again, in Westchester Electric Railroad Co. v. West-
chester County Park Commission, 255 N.Y. 297, 174 N. E. 
660, and based upon the statute authorizing the county 
to build the Hutchinson River Parkway, the Court held 
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that the Commission had the power to agree with a rail-
road and a gas company to reimburse them for necessary 
expenses in relocating their facilities. 
But, in Trarnsit Commissio.n v. Long Isl(}f'}'l;.(l Railroad 
Company, 253 N.Y. 345, 171 N. E. 565, and in New York 
Tunnel Authority v. Consolidated Edison Co., 295 N. Y. 
467, 68 N. E. 2d 445, contrary results were reached. In 
the latter case, the Authority was created as a public cor-
poration to construct the Queens Midtown Tunnel and 
the project was to be financed through the issuance of 
revenue bonds. Nonetheless, the Court construed the 
statute as requiring that the utility pay its relocation 
costs. In the first case cited in this paragraph a gas com-
pany was required to pay its relocation costs in connec-
tion with the elimination of a grade crossing by the use 
of a highway overpass. The Court cited New Orlea;n.s Gas-
light Co. v. Drainage Commission of New Orleans, supra., 
and quoted from this case as follows : 
'' 'It would be unreasonable to suppose that in 
the grant to the gas company of the right to use 
the streets in the laying of its pipes it was ever 
intended to surrender or impair the public right 
to discharge the duty of conserving the public 
health. The gas company did not acquire any spe-
cific location in the streets; it was content with 
the general right to use them; and when it located 
its pipes it was at the risk that they might be at 
some future time, disturbed, when the state might 
require for a necessary public use that changes in 
location be made. * * * We see no reason why 
the same principle should not apply to the subsur-
face of the streets, which, no less than the surface, 
is primarily under public control. The need of 
10 
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occupation of the soil beneath the streets in cities 
is constantly increasing, for the supply of water 
and light and the construction of systems of sew-
erage and drainage; and every reason of public 
policy requires that grants of rights in such sub-
surface shall be held subject .to such -reasonable 
regulation as the public. health and safety may 
require.' '' 
And, finally the case of Southern Bell Telep·hone & 
Telegraph Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 266 S. W. 
2d 308, shows the following fact situation as taken from 
the Court's opinion : 
''The Watterson Expressway is a new limited 
access Federal-aid highway. It has been planned 
and is being constructed to connect U. S. highways 
42, 60, 31E, -and 31W in such a way as to enable 
traffic to proceed from:either of said highways to 
the other without going through the business sec-
tion of the city of Louisville. One-third of the 
right of way cost and one-half of the construction 
cost are to be paid by the Federal government. 
The new highway crosses, at various points, nu-
merous established highways upon which Southern 
Bell has for many years maintained its poles, 
wires, and conduits. At certain points, it includes 
for a short distance portions of previously estab-
lished public highways. At such points, it is neces-
sary that the telephone company's facilities be 
removed and relocated in order to construct the 
new Expressway.'' 
Based upon this fact situation, the Court ruled as follows : 
''We take judicial notice of the fact that most of 
the highway construction in Kentucky has oc-
curred during the past thirty years. If' we accept 
appellant's narrow construction of its legislative 
11 
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franchise, the state would have been required to 
locate or relocate its principal roads built within 
that time with the primary object of avoiding in-
terference with appellant's facilities rather than 
conforming to the convenience and safety of the 
traveling public. The necessary alternative to lo-
cation of its roads so as not to affect appellant's 
facilities would have been that the state should pay 
for the removal and location of the poles and lines 
which interfered with construction of new high-
ways or improvement or reconstruction of existing 
roads. If construed as requiring removal and re-
location at the expense of the state, the franchise 
was in violation of Article II, §33, of our Third 
Constitution, which was carried over into Section 
177 of our present constitution, and provided: 
'' 'The credit of this Commonwealth shall not 
be given or loaned in aid of any person, 
association, municipality, or corporation.' '' 
In addition to the five states noted above, seven state 
legislatures adopted statutes similar to or identical with 
Chapter 53 of the 1957 Session Laws of Utah; and the 
courts of each of these seven states have had occasion to 
rule upon the validity and effect of such a statute. Again, 
we feel it necessary to cite these cases and comment upon 
them and, in the order in which we propose to discuss 
them, the cases cited are from the states of Texas, ~Iaine, 
New Hampshire, Minnesota, Tennessee, New Mexico and 
Idaho. 
In State of Texas v. City of Dallas, 319 S.W. 2d 767, 
the state sought a declaratory judgment as to the consti-
tutionality of a statute similar to the Utah statute in 
question here. Joined as defendants, in addition to the 
12 
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City of Dallas, were the City of Austin, Southern Union 
Gas Company, Lone Star Gas Company, Dallas Power 
and Light Company and Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Company. In addition to other grounds not material to 
the present controversy, it was urged that the statute was 
invalid and in violation of the Texas Constitution as a 
gift or loan of the credit of the state and as a release of 
the obligations of corporations and individuals. In sus-
taining the constitutionality of the statute, the interme-
diate Texas appellate court indulges in many citations and 
we are not impressed with the reasoning advanced in sup-
port of the ruling. We are advised that this case is on 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas and we are not 
informed that a decision has been rendered as of the date 
of this writing. 
Both of the cases from Maine and New Hampshire are 
cited as Opinion of the Justices, the former at 132 A. 2d 
440, and the latter at 132 A. 2d 613. Both cases arose from 
a request by the state legislature to the State Supreme 
Court requesting an advisory opinion as to the constitu-
tionality of pending legislation similar to that enacted in 
Utah as Chapter 53 of the 1957 Session Laws. In the 
Maine case, the court found the statute to be constitutional 
as long as the funds for the payment of relocation costs 
did not come from that fund reserved by the Maine Con-
stitution for the construction and reconstruction of high-
"'"ays. The court did not construe that language to include 
the relocation of a utility facility. The New Hampshire 
decision held that the legislature may declare the reloca-
13 
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tion of utility facilities to be a part of highway construc-
tion and to be paid out of highway funds. 
'.: May we note that in neither case was any inquiry 
directed to any constitutional provitli.on similar to those 
in our Utah Constitution; and may we call the Court's 
attention to the fact that, under the practice in Maine and 
New Hampshire, an opinion of the justices is not an opin-
ion of the Court. It is construed as the giving of. advice 
by the individual members of the Court and is not bind-
ing in an adversary proceeding. See Martin v. Maine Sav-
ing Barnk (Maine), 147 A. 2d 137, and Opinion of Justices, 
76 N. H. 597, 74A. 490. 
In the Minnesota case of Min.neapolis Gas Co. v. Zim-
merman, 91 N. W. 2d 642, the company under agreement 
with the Commissioner of Highways undertook the reloca-
tion of its utilities and thereafter sought reimbursement 
for the cost of such relocation. A summary judgment 
:'Was entered in favor of the company and an appeal was 
taken by the Highway Commissioner. Minnesota in 1957 
h_ad enacted a statute similar to Chapter 53 of the 1957 
S~ssion Laws of Utah and reimbursement was sought 
under that statute. The defense to reimbursement was 
based upon the contention that the statute in question was 
violative of the Minnesota Constitution on five grounds, 
namely: (1) That it diverted funds for a nonhighway 
purpose; (2) That it authorized the expenditure of funds 
for a private purpose and that it constituted a loan or gift 
of the credit of the state; (3) That it constituted the con-
tracting of debts for works of internal improvement; ( 4) 
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That it granted a special or exclusive privilege, immunity 
or franchise to a corporaion; and ( 5) That it impaired the 
obligation of a contract. 
Although the Minnesota Court resolved all five ques-
tions in favor of the constitutionality of the statute, only 
the discussion as to subdivision (2) above is of importance 
to the matter before this Court. In finding that there was 
no loan of the state's credit, the Court examined the public 
nature of utilities and the express purpose of the statute 
and then made the following observation: 
' ' * * * The realities of the situation are that the 
people of Minnesota would suffer economically if 
the state failed to take advantage of Federal aid 
made available to the privately and municipally 
owned utilities of this state under the Federal-Aid 
Highway Act of 1956, in 70 Stat. 383, 23 U. S. C. A. 
§ 162. The Federal-aid program is to be financed 
out of Federal funds, presumably resulting from 
Federal taxes contributed in part by the people of 
this state. If the utilities located in this state must 
undertake relocation of their facilities without a 
right to reimbursement, their costs will be substan-
tially increased and this in turn will be reflected in 
higher utility rates in Minnesota communities. 
Furthermore, to the extent that other states effec-
tuate Federal aid to their utilities and Minnesota 
does not, the people of Minnesota will be paying 
Federal taxes which will benefit the people of the 
other states but which will not benefit the people 
of Minnesota. The resulting economic benefit to 
the people of Minnesota from an authorization of 
these expenditures is a benefit to the community 
as a whole." 
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We find it difficult to accept the reasoning that a 
statute should be found constitutional because it will oper-
ate to the benefit of the citizens of the state and because 
a contrary ruling would cause the citizens of that state to 
suffer tax-wise. We believe it proper to consider that 
.wherever moneys are to be made available through fed-
eral sources if one state gains financially another state 
must suffer some financial loss. The argument advanced 
in the Minnesota case would have the effect of holding 
the statute in question constitutional where a benefit is 
derived and unconstitutional if a financial loss were to 
ensue. It is difficult for us to conceive that the same 
statute will be declared constitutional or unconstitutional 
depending entirely upon whether or not a particular state 
will or will not reap a financial advantage therefrom. 
The Minnesota Constitution, Article 9, Section 10, 
provides: 
''The credit of the state shall never be given or 
loaned in aid of any individual, association or 
corporation * * *. '' 
The case of Minneapolis Ga.s Co. v. Zimmerman, supra, 
holds that this provision does not prevent ''the legisla-
ture from, by prospective action (that is by an enactment 
prior to the ordering of a relocation of utility facilities 
or prior to the commencement of a great public 'vork 
requiring such relocation), fixing the conditions of per-
formance and making provisions for the future recogni-
tion of claims for damages founded on equity and justice, 
although such claims would otherwise be damnum absque 
in.juria and unenforceable against the state.'' 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
We submit that the Utah Constitution is not sus-
eeptible of the same interpretation and that the use of 
the language ''the Legislature shall not authorize the 
state • • • to lend its credit • • * '' does not permit of 
legislative action to the contrary even if it be on a pros-
pective basis. 
The remaining three cases have found the reimburse-
ment provision of the relocation statutes to be invalid 
based upon the Constitution of the state involved. The 
first case is State of Tenrnessee v. Southern Bell Tele-
phone Co., 319 S. W. 2d 90. This action was brought in 
the name of the state on the relation of the Commissioner 
of Highways for a declaratory judgment seeking a 
declaration as to the constitutionality of a utility reloca-
tion statute substantially the same as the one passed by 
the Utah Legislature. The court discussed the purpose 
sought to be accomplished, found it to be neither a state 
or a public purpose and said: 
''If the Legislature is without authority under the 
Constitution to enact a law, the situation is the 
same as though there were no attempted enact-
ment. Since the Constitution forbids the State 
from giving, or lending its credit'* * * to or in aid 
of any person, association, company, corporation 
or municipality,' it is immaterial whether there is 
an attempt to have public monies paid out under 
the guise of legislative sanction. 
''We think that the basic test under this Section 
of our Constitution is whether the expenditure is 
for a State purpose. In the present case the pri-
mary purpose served by the expenditure is for the 
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convenience and benefit of the utilities, the pur-
pose cannot be public. * * * '' 
~~ may be noted that this case was the subje_ct of a re_-
h..earing granted by the Tennessee _court and the opinion 
on rehearing reasserted the invalidity of the statute. ·A 
~oncurring opinion offered the observation that "if by it~ 
·fiat the legislature can authorize the expenditure of these 
large sums on properties in which the state has no :finan-
·cial interest and no control other than the_ regulatory 
powers over any corporation 'affected with a public inter-
.est,' then I see no way to restrain the legislature within 
the limits of Article II, Section 31 of our State Constitu-
tion, whenever it may decide to do equity according to its 
own conception. '' 
_May we offer the further observation and urge upon 
t.he Court that, if the state legislature may declare it to 
be a public purpose and require that the state pay the 
costs of the relocation of the utility facilities, it may in 
the first instance require the state to pay all of the initial 
·cost of locating the utility on the public highway. We 
submit that such a construction ·would wholly negative 
the constitutional limitation without a constitutional 
amendment. 
The second case is State Hightvay Commission v. 
Southern} Union Gas Co., 65 N. M. 84, 332 P. 2d 1007. In 
this case the declaratory judgment procedure was again 
used to determine the cons~itutionality of the utility relo-
cation statute passed by the New l\Iexico legislature. The 
act is a.gain substantially the same as the one under 
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attack in the instant case. The New Mexico Constitution 
prohibits a donation of state funds in aid of a private 
corporation and also prohibits the release of an existing 
obligation. In determining the relocation statute to be 
repugnant to these sections of the Constitution, the New 
rvrexico Supreme Court quoted from the recent case of 
Mulkey v. Quillian, 213 Ga. 507, 100 S. E. 2d 268, as 
follows: 
''The removal and relocation of utility facilities 
is not a necessary or usual adjunct to the construc-
tion of highways. State-aid highways can be and 
are constructed and maintained without any utility 
facilities being located on their rights-of-way. 
Utility facilities are placed thereon purely for the 
convenience of the political subdivisions or author-
ities controlling the utility and serve no useful 
or desirable purpose in the construction and 
maintenance of the highway itself and serve no 
convenience of the highway or the highway de-
partment. 
Continuing the New Mexico Court said: 
''In conclusion, we would answer the main argu-
ment of the appellee that relocation of these utili-
ties is a public governmental function by stating 
that the construction of highways is unquestion-
ably a public governmental function but that we 
disagree as to relocation of utility facilities. High-
\vays are constructed by the state on state-owned 
rights-of-way for the use of the public. The South-
ern Union Gas Company, in laying its gas lines, is 
acting solely for the benefit of the utility. The line 
is the property of the utility and to be used solely 
by it, neither the state nor the public having any 
right to use these lines. The Southern Union Gas 
Company is not a subordinate governmental 
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agency nor is it fulfilling a governmental function 
although it is serving a highly useful purpose in 
the great American free enterprise tradition by 
furnishing for profit an essential commodity to 
the people of this state.'' 
And the New Mexico Court concluded as follows: 
''Much has been said concerning the power of the 
legislature to reimburse the utility on the basis of 
equity and justice. That the legislature has the 
power to be equitable and just we may admit, but 
that power is restricted by the Constitution. Other-
\Vise the prohibition against a donation would have 
no meaning or effect. As stated in State ex rel. 
Sena v. Trujillo, ( 46 N.M. 361, 129 P. 2d 333) 'the 
constitution makes no distinction as between ''do-
nations," whether they be for a good cause or a 
questionable one. It prohibits them all * * *.' " 
The third case in this group was decided by the Idaho 
Supreme Court on October 2, 1958, and has not yet been 
reported. It is entitled State of Idaho v. Idaho Power 
Company a,rnd Moun.fa,in States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company. The same declaratory judgment action was 
brought on behalf of the state to test the same type of 
utility relocation statute. The Idaho Constitution, Article 
8, Section 2, is almost identical \vith its Utah counterpart 
and reads as follows: 
"The eredit of the state shall not, in anY manner, 
be given, or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, 
association, municipality or corporation.'' 
In holding the relocation statute invalid, the Idaho Court 
said: 
"Clearly, the legislature at all times has recog-
nized, and continues to recognize that all roads, 
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streets and highways are held in trust by the state 
and its political subdivisions for use by the public; 
also, that the granting by the state or political 
subdivision of a vested or permanent property 
right or interest in any public street or highway 
would not only be violative of such public trust, 
but would result in diminution of the quantum of 
ownership of the public in its public thorough-
fares; and that so to do would constitute the giving 
or loaning of the credit of the state to or in aid of 
an individual, municipality or corporation, vio-
lative of Idaho Constitution, Article 8, Section 2, 
or a gift of the public property in violation of the 
implied limitations of the Constitution.'' 
The decision of the Idaho Court is lengthy and contains 
a good resume of most of the cases dealing with the sub-
ject, and of more than passing interest is the reference 
to the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 
2 L. Ed. 60, and to the following statement from Chief 
Justice Marshall : 
''The Constitution is either a superior, paramount 
law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a 
level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other 
acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please 
to alter it. If the former part of the alternative 
be true, then a legislative act contrary to the Con-
stitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then 
"\Vritten Constitutions are absurd attempts, on the 
part of the people, to limit a power in its own 
nature illimitable. '' 
And may we refer to this Court's recent decision in 
the case of Moon Lake Electric Association and U intah 
Basin Telephone Association v. Utah State Tax Commis-
sion, decided on October 29, 1959, and not yet reported. In 
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holding ·that certain acts· dealing with the taxation of 
cooperative nonprofit corp~rations were unconstitutional, 
this Court said : 
''The petitioners assert that the Sections 16-6-16 
and 17 are just and wise legislation. They feel that 
the public will benefit from the effect of such 
statutes. Unqoubtedly the majority of the legisla-
tors concurred 'in -this view. As interesting as pe-
titioners' views thereon are, this court cannot 
properly consider them here. The analogy to the 
· · situation presented in State v. Armstrong (17 
Utah 166, 53 Pac. 98), is noted. There the section 
under consideration provided, so far as material, 
that a board of equalization 'may remit or abate 
the taxes· of any insane, idiot, infirm or indigent 
person to an amount not exceeding $10.00 for the 
current year.' The court there said: 'In arriving 
at the conclusions that the provision of the statute 
in controversy is null and void, we were not un-
mindful of the fact that the question whether an 
enactment of the legislature is void because of its 
repugnancy to the constitution is always one of 
much delicacy, and in a doubtful case should sel-
dom, if ever' be decided in the affirmative. Where, 
however, the mind is convinced of the unconstitu-
tionality of the law, the duty which devolves upon 
the court to declare it so is imperative, even where, 
as in this case, the statute appears to be in con-
sonance with justice and humanity. That the law 
itself would be beneficent can be of no avail in this 
case, because its effect and operation would be to 
exempt property, against the mandate of the fun-
damental law.' " 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that Chapter 53 of the 
1957 Session Laws of Utah is repugnant to both Sections 
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27 and 31 of Article VI of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah to the extent that the chapter directs the reim~ 
bursement of utilities for their costs of relocating facili-
ties presently on public rights-of-way. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
. Attorney General 
ROBERT B. PORTER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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